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Comparative psychology is by nature an 
interdisciplinary science that lies at the 
crossroads of psychology and biology but 
also draws from other fields in the natural, 
social, and cognitive sciences. The study of 
the psychology of animals has been labeled 
animal cognition, comparative cognition, 
animal learning, animal psychology, and 
animal intelligence. Here, comparative 
psychology is used interchangeably with 
these terms, encompassing all fields that 
explore the psychological mechanisms 
underlying animal behavior, including 
human behavior.
The primary goal of comparative psy-
chology is to understand the cognitive, 
emotional, and motivational processes of 
the animal mind. How do other animals 
perceive, learn about, and make decisions 
in their worlds? From our pets to exotic 
animals portrayed in nature documenta-
ries, we are inherently curious about other 
animals. Comparative psychology both pro-
vides a window into their minds, as well as 
offers a unique perspective on the human 
mind. Which aspects of our psychology do 
animals share? Human uniqueness is con-
stantly challenged as we learn more about 
the psychology of animal minds. Once dis-
tinctive human abilities – such as tool use, 
language, and mental time travel – appear, 
at least to a degree, in other species. Though 
other species exhibit elements of these abili-
ties, the central question for comparing 
humans and animals remains, do humans 
and other animals share the same psycho-
logical mechanisms?
Comparative psychology explores many 
of the same topics as human psychology. 
From learning and memory to commu-
nication and decision making, the field 
investigates a number of key questions, for 
example:
•	 How	 do	 animals	 understand	 causal	
relationships in their environments?
•	 Can	animals	represent	the	perceptions,	
intentions, and beliefs of others?
•	 Do	animals	plan	for	the	future?
•	 Can	 animals	 use	 referential	
communication?
•	 How	 do	 animals	 track	 time	 and	
number?
•	 Do	 animals	maintain	 a	 cognitive	map	
of their environment?
•	 Do	animals	attend	to	the	well	being	of	
others?
•	 How	 do	 animals	 categorize	 objects	 in	
their world?
•	 Which	emotional	and	motivational	fac-
tors underly animal behavior?
Studying the psychology of other species 
is not easy. With rare exceptions, we can-
not ask directly about their psychological 
states. Instead, we must make inferences 
about the psychology of animals based on 
their behavior. Inferring internal mecha-
nisms from external behavior results in a 
number of challenges for comparative psy-
chologists. Though we have met a number 
of these challenges, several remain, slow-
ing our progress in advancing comparative 
psychology. To push forward, we must meet 
these conceptual and practical challenges 
head on.
The complexiTy of parsimony
The difficulties of making inferences about 
internal mechanisms has spawned two 
general approaches to studying cognitive 
aspects of animal behavior. The animal 
learning	approach	emphasizes	the	general	
learning principles, such as instrumental, 
and Pavlovian conditioning, espoused by 
Hull, Spence, Tolman, and Skinner. The 
cognitive approach examines other forms 
of cognition such as perception, attention, 
memory,	categorization,	navigation,	timing,	
number, communication, decision mak-
ing, and social cognition. Though learning 
mechanisms often are considered simpler 
explanations, some cognitive mechanisms 
are more complex, requiring an organism 
to generate a mental representation. Since 
Morgan’s (1903) admonition to opt for the 
most parsimonious explanation supported 
by the data, the learning tradition has set the 
benchmark for parsimonious explanations. 
If a simpler, learning account can explain 
the data, then we should not invoke a more 
complex explanation. This stringent bench-
mark has set a high bar for researchers in the 
cognitive	tradition	to	reject	simple	learning	
explanations. Occasionally, the bar is raised 
higher and higher, sometimes to the extent 
that the learning mechanism becomes quite 
complex. How complex does a parsimoni-
ous explanation need to be before we accept 
a representational one? How do we define 
the complexity of a mechanism? One solu-
tion is to sidestep the parsimony/complexity 
question completely. Rather than resorting 
to a scale of psychological complexity, we 
can develop and test more precise models 
of the phenomena of interest.
Even after excluding simpler explana-
tions for phenomena, the question arises, 
under what circumstances do animals 
use the more complex form of cognition? 
Possessing a particular psychological ability 
does not imply using it at every opportu-
nity. In many cases, animals may use simpler 
mechanisms, reserving the more complex 
mechanisms for situations in which the sim-
pler mechanisms do not work. The circum-
stances under which animals use different 
mechanisms remains an open question in 
comparative psychology.
individual differences
A hallmark of data in comparative psychol-
ogy	is	variation	across	individuals.	Despite	
this, we have very little understanding of 
the sources of variation in psychological 
mechanisms. Evolutionary models predict 
individual differences in behavior (Wolf 
et al., 2007), but few models explore why 
cognition and emotion should vary across 
individuals. A number of questions arise 
when developing a theoretical understand-
ing of individual differences. Is there really 
variation in animal psychological abilities 
or only in the expression of these abilities? 
To what extent is this variation adaptive? To 
what extent does the variation result from 
environmental influences? Are there general 
Frontiers in Psychology | Comparative Psychology  November 2010 | Volume 1 | Article 203 | 2
Stevens Understanding animal minds
that tap natural behaviors and situations 
can yield more valid studies of compara-
tive psychology.
sTrong inference
Much of comparative psychology is based 
on	existence	proofs:	Do	animals	have	theory	
of mind, metacognition, episodic memory, 
empathy, or other-regarding preferences? To 
further mature, however, the field needs to 
develop more sophisticated models of how 
psychological	mechanisms	work,	 not	 just	
whether they are present and what influ-
ences them. Weisman (2008) offers an 
important challenge to the young research-
ers in behavioral and cognitive science: 
embrace Platt’s (1964) notion of strong 
inference.	Strong	inference	emphasizes	the	
development of multiple hypotheses and 
the design of critical experiments allowing 
for alternative outcomes that will exclude 
some of the hypotheses. Currently, many 
behavioral scientists rely on testing a single 
hypothesis against a null hypothesis, despite 
the pitfalls of this approach (Marewski and 
Olsson, 2009). Rather than only testing for 
the presence or absence of a psychological 
ability or for factors that influence an abil-
ity, we need to explore how the processes 
work. To this end, testing a series of for-
mal process-based models allows a precise 
understanding of psychological mecha-
nisms. Though formal models are common 
in the animal learning tradition (e.g., mod-
els of timing), other areas of comparative 
psychology have yet to use these models to 
their full potential.
Developing	and	testing	multiple	hypoth-
eses yields more careful inferences because 
more powerful statistical techniques can 
be used. Instead of relying on the weak 
null hypothesis testing paradigm, we can 
use competitive model testing techniques 
to discriminate between hypotheses. 
Incorporating process models and competi-
tive model selection into the strong infer-
ence approach can only raise the level of 
rigor for comparative psychology.
replicaTion and reproducible 
research
Around the turn of the twentieth century, 
a horse named Clever Hans captivated first 
Germany	and	then	the	world	with	amazing	
feats of arithmetic skill. Alas, the even more 
clever Pfungst (1911) debunked the horse 
by demonstrating that Hans simply used 
share similar psychological mechanisms? 
What kinds of evolutionary pressures 
shape psychological mechanisms across 
species?	Does	the	social	environment	play	
a special role in shaping psychology? How 
can we test whether species share actual 
mechanisms	rather	than	just	general	psy-
chological abilities? Comparisons across 
species pose difficulties and require great 
care regarding the species tested and the 
experimental methods used. Nevertheless, 
the fruits of this labor will yield valu-
able insights into the nature of animal 
psychology.
ecological relevance
Simon (1990) argued that a serious study 
of cognition must explore both the mind 
and the environment in which the mind 
interacts. He likened this to two blades 
in a pair of scissors that cannot function 
unless both blades are present. This pro-
vides an important lesson for comparative 
psychology as well. Studies of comparative 
psychology frequently face criticism for 
overly artificial task environments. Using 
simple stimuli in impoverished apparatuses 
offers clear advantages in terms of reduc-
ing the likelihood of confounding variables. 
Unfortunately, this gain in internal valid-
ity comes at the price of reducing external 
validity. Striking a balance between careful 
control over the experimental situation and 
eliciting meaningful responses is critical to 
understanding animal psychology (Cook, 
1993). The right balance starts with asking 
ecologically relevant questions. What kinds 
of mechanisms do animals need to navigate 
through their physical and social worlds?
The next step is to develop experimen-
tal stimuli and tasks that tap the natural 
abilities of animals. Though simple artifi-
cial stimuli offer complete control over the 
features	presented	to	animal	subjects,	Cook 
(1993) argues that more naturalistic stimuli 
of intermediate complexity can offer a rea-
sonable balance between control and eco-
logical relevance. In addition, Hare (2001) 
argues that we must consider the natural 
ecology of the species to develop appro-
priate experimental tasks. When placed in 
unnatural situations, animals may not dem-
onstrate the relevant psychological mecha-
nism. Though not easy to conduct, field 
experiments can offer the most naturalis-
tic circumstances for testing psychological 
mechanisms	in	animals.	Developing	tasks	
reasons for variation in psychology or do 
we need to consider each ability separately? 
Researchers of animal behavior investigate 
individual differences under the headings of 
animal personality, behavioral syndromes, 
and temperament. We must now extend this 
study of variation at the psychological level 
and explore the sources of such variation.
puTTing The comparaTive back 
inTo comparaTive psychology
Despite	the	name	and	origins	of	the	field,	
comparative psychology lacked many com-
parative studies during much of the twenti-
eth century. Only a handful of species acted 
as the workhorses of the field: the pigeon, 
the rat, and the rhesus macaque. Focusing 
on a few species offers a more in-depth and 
cumulative method for understanding the 
psychology of those species. This restric-
tion, however, limits our broader under-
standing of psychological mechanisms in 
animals. Comparative psychologists have 
lamented this lack of diversity for decades 
(Beach, 1950; Cook, 1993; Shettleworth, 
1993), and, more recently, researchers have 
tested a number of interesting questions in a 
wide variety of species, ranging from insects 
and octopods to tortoises and manatees. We 
should continue to meet the challenge of 
casting a wide taxonomic net.
Cataloging the abilities of various species 
provides a necessary first step in understand-
ing the psychology of animals. However, 
comparative does not mean simply collect-
ing information on a broad range of spe-
cies; it also implies active comparison across 
species (Shettleworth, 1993). The implicit 
comparison in the early days of compara-
tive psychology was between a single ani-
mal species and humans. Comparisons have 
become more explicit recently, borrowing 
methods directly from fields such as cogni-
tive psychology, developmental psychology, 
social psychology, and economics. When 
testing questions of human psychology 
in animals, we should strive to make the 
experiments as comparable as possible 
across species.
Comparing	 not	 just	 to	 humans	 but	
across animal species opens a host of 
new questions to investigation. In par-
ticular, the comparative method allows 
the testing of evolutionary questions 
regarding the origins of and ecological 
pressures on psychological mechanisms. 
Do		phylogenetically	closely	related	species	
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questions and continually be mindful of the 
most rigorous means to achieve our goal of 
delving into the minds of animals.
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Allowing free access to data and data 
analyses is equally important in advancing 
comparative psychology because it allows 
for reproducible research (de Leeuw, 
2001). With the available electronic tech-
nologies, scientists can include data files 
either as supplementary materials pub-
lished	on	a	journal’s	website	or	posted	on	
the author’s website. In addition to pub-
lishing the data, granting access to how 
the	data	were	analyzed	can	be	useful	for	
other scientists. Some statistical software 
programs, including the freely available 
R software for statistical computing2, 
allow the reporting of not only statistical 
results but also the code used to generate 
the results. Making this code freely avail-
able facilitates both error checking and 
direct reproduction of data analysis. Thus, 
posting experimental protocols, example 
videos, data files, and analysis code main-
tains the transparent nature of science. In 
the spirit of the mission of open access, 
we at Frontiers in Comparative Psychology 
encourage the publication of methods, 
data, and data analysis along with scien-
tific articles.
looking ahead
Comparative psychology explores the fasci-
nating topic of the animal mind. The field 
has made great strides in the recent years, 
though more work remains. We face excit-
ing conceptual challenges such as grappling 
with issues of parsimony and complexity, 
exploring individual differences, and pos-
ing careful comparative questions of psy-
chological mechanism. We also share more 
practical challenges with other areas in 
behavioral science and beyond, including 
developing more naturalistic experimental 
paradigms, implementing strong inference 
techniques, and producing reproducible 
and transparent research. No single piece 
of scientific work will likely address all of 
these challenges. Nevertheless, to advance 
comparative psychology into the twenty-
first century, we must carefully craft our 
inadvertent cues from his owner or others 
during the questioning. This story is often 
the first cautionary tale learned by all com-
parative psychologists as they enter the field. 
It reminds us that the wishes and biases of 
the observer can influence the observation. 
It also has encouraged meticulous method-
ologies for researching animal psychology. 
Our field could improve, however, in foster-
ing replication and reproducible research.
A core principle of experimental 
research methods is to replicate studies. 
This is common practice in human psy-
chology experiments, perhaps because a 
new pool of participants is available each 
semester at the university. The typically 
small	 sample	 sizes	 used	 in	 comparative	
psychology can make replication difficult. 
Nevertheless, we should encourage the gen-
eral practice of replicating our work and 
publishing these replications, even if they 
result in different findings. As one solu-
tion to facilitating replications, we can 
grant free access to experimental methods. 
The	Comparative	Mind	Database1 offers a 
systematic attempt to maintain free access 
to experimental methods in comparative 
psychology by archiving experimental 
protocols and video clips of experimental 
sessions. This database facilitates compara-
tive	studies	by	standardizing	experimental	
procedures such that researchers may use 
similar protocols across species. In addi-
tion to exact replications of methods, we 
need to replicate our studies using differ-
ent methods. As scientists, we often become 
enamored with our methodologies. Yet, the 
use of a single method to test a hypothesis 
can result in a biased view of the phenom-
enon of interest. Returning to Simon’s scis-
sors, cognition cannot be understood fully 
without accounting for the environment, 
and	ensuring	that	our	findings	generalize	
across multiple experimental environments 
is crucial. Replicating our work within lab-
oratories, between laboratories, and across 
methodologies strengthens the integrity of 
our conclusions.
1http://www.cmdbase.org/ 2http://www.r-project.org/
